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This paper summarizes our efforts in implementing a
working multi-level secure database prototype. We have
chosen Belief-Consistent Multilevel Secure Relational
Data Model  BCMLS as a basis for our prototype
because of its comprehensive semantics for interpreting
all stored information. While semantically superior to
other models, this model has not been implemented as
a working system before. Our prototype, which was
created on an Informix database server with a PHP
web client, enables insertion, deletion and update of
multi-level data while addressing the underlying model
complexities through a number of original solutions.
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1. Introduction
The aim of the research described in this paper
was to implement a working multilevel-secure
database prototype. Multilevel Secure  MLS
models are based on the classification of the
system elements, where classifications are ex-
pressed by security levels. Data objects have
security levels and users have clearance lev-
els. As an example, we can have three possible
security levels S-Secret, C-Classified, and U-
Unclassified, where S is a higher classification
than C and U, and C is a higher classification
than U. A security  or clearance level l1 domi-
nates another level l2  stated as l1   l2, if l1 is
higher than or at the same level as l2 in the partial
 or total order of security levels. For example,
S   C   U. According to the Bell-LaPadula 1
simple property, a subject  user can read a cer-
tain object  data only if the subject’s clearance
level dominates the object’s security level. In
other words, a subject cannot read an object at
a higher or incomparable security level than the
subject. Many MLS relational database models
have been proposed. Early work in MLS rela-
tional databases was focused on the semantics
and the relational algebra for MLS models. The
SeaView model 2 was the first formal MLS
secure relational database designed to provide
mandatory security protection. The Sea View
model extended the concept of a database rela-
tion to include the security labels. A relation
that is extended with security classifications is
called amultilevel relation. The Jajodia-Sandhu
model 4was derived from the SeaView model.
It was shown that the SeaView model can result
in the proliferation of tuples on updates 3 and
the Jajodia-Sandhu model addressed this short-
coming. The Smith-Winslett model 7 was the
first model to extensively address the semantics
of anMLSdatabase. Inwas shown that all of the
aforementioned models can present users with
some information that is difficult to interpret 5.
Consequently, the BCMLS model  thoroughly
described in 6 addressed those concerns by
including the semantics for an unambiguous in-
terpretation of all data presented to the users.
Due to its comprehensive semantics, we have
chosen the BCMLS model as a basis for our
prototype1.
1 For more background information about various MLS approaches and the associated database models we refer you to  6.
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2. Implementation: Basics
Table 1 shows a typical structure of an BCMLS
table. A security label contains a list of lev-
els. These labels provide a user with a com-
prehensive interpretation of every part of every
visible tuple. Primary level of each label is a
security level where the value is inserted into
the database. In every security label, the first
letter represents its primary level. Remaining
letters are called secondary levels and indicate






Cruiser CS Protecting CS Venus CS
Enterprise S Trading S Earth S
Falcon S Exploring S Tatuin S
Hawk UC-S Spying UC-S Mars UC-S
Micra U-CS Observation U-CS Moon U-CS
Table 1.
A lower level tuple can be interpreted by a





 irrelevant  not yet interpreted
If a lower level tuple represents the same entity
as some other higher level tuple, the lower level
tuple is interpreted by a higher level user as a
false tuple that represents a cover story.
If a false tuple doesn’t correspond to any real
world entity in the belief of higher level user,
such tuple represents a mirage tuple for the
higher level user.
The entity identifier for the relation shown in
Table 1 is: Vessel  Vessel Class. That means
that, for instance “EnterpriseC” and “Enterprise
U” are two different ships.
The Table 1 presents the entire relation, which
is at the same time the S-level user view. Ta-
ble 2 shows the C-level user view and Table 3
shows the U-level user view. The U-level user
view shows no classification labels because U-
level users should not even know that they are






Cruiser C Protecting C Venus C
Hawk UC Spying UC Mars UC







One of the main tasks that the system based on
the BCMLS model must support is to present to
the users on different security levels only parts
of security labels that those users have the right
to see. Let us take an example of security label:
U-CS
 U-level user can see: U  in fact U-level
user in our implementation does not see
any security label - in his world there is no
multilevel database
 C-level user can see: U-C
 S-level user can see: U-CS
Obviously, we need a function that will return a
part of security label according to the user level.
In our prototype, we used a numerical system
with base 3. For example, C level is accounted
for in a label as follows:
 C  2  true
 -C  1  false
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 absence of C in the label  0  irrelevant
One security label consists of U-level data, C-
level data and S-level data. For example, UCS
security label would be represented as 222.
Combining with a numerical system with base
3 we have:
UCS             
Some other examples:
UCS             
US   	     	     
The complete security label is represented with
one integer. Simple mathematical operation can
break that integer number into individual parts
of the multi-level security label. This is done
using simple division andmodulo function. The










In our prototype, we maintain a system table
 shown as Table 4 that contains information
about the users and their security levels. The
values for column ul are from the domain inte-






The following query returns the security level




The result of this query is used in the follow-
ing procedure that returns the visible part of
the security label for the user who executes that
procedure
procedure xview label 
break label into parts










In the BCMLS data model three important func-
tions are defined:
1. plL returns the primary level of security
label L
Examples:
L   UCS plL  U
L   CS plL   C
Implementation:
procedure plL 
break levels into parts
return the first part that has a
value 

2. slL extracts and returns secondary levels
of security label L
sl function only indicates if belief at some level
exists, it doesn’t reveal if it’s a true or false. In
the second example above it doesn’t matter if
LC-S or LCS. The result will be the same.
Examples:
L   UCS slL   CS
L   CS slL   S
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Implementation:
procedure slL 




3. lbcL extracts and returns the belief of
a user from the security level c about the infor-
mation labeled by the label L.
Our procedure takes only one argument: se-
curity label. User level is extracted from the
system table ’Users’ inside the procedure.
Examples:
L   UCS lbSL   S
L   CS lbSL   S
Implementation:
procedure lbL 
break levels into parts












In our implementation we were driven by the
idea to build as much as possible by using
DBMS mechanisms, through stored procedures
and triggers. Consequently, the client software
should only take parts that cannot be imple-
mented with the DBMS facilities.
After implementing the basic functions as shown
above, the next task was to build appropriate
views of MLS database relation. Considering
the fact that U-level user must not be aware of
MLS database at all, we had to build two views:
one for U-level user and the other for higher
level users who should see part of security la-
bels on their own and on the levels below.
For better understanding we present dbschema










Attribute ’tc’ is the security classification for
the whole tuple and ’flag’ is a system attribute
 used to delete and update procedures, shown
in Sections 6 and 7.
Implementation, U-level user view:
CREATE VIEW
vstarshipxvesselxobjectivexdest AS
SELECT vessel objective dest
FROM starship
WHERE xviewtc  	
WITH CHECK OPTION









WHERE xviewtc  	
WITH CHECK OPTION
Users can access table only via views. The view
presents them exactly with what they have the
right to see. U-level user can see only regu-
lar attributes without security labels. Higher
level users can see all attributes, parts of secu-
rity labels on their own and on the levels below.
Consider the example in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Ta-
ble 5 represents S-level view, Table 6 represents
C-level view, while Table 7 represents U-level
view.






Cruiser C Protecting C Venus C
Hawk UCS Spying UC Mars UCS







Cruiser C Protecting C Venus C
Hawk UC Spying UC Mars UC







The insert is implemented through stored pro-
cedure. The procedure takes attributes as ar-
guments, calculates value of security label and
inserts a complete tuple into the table.
For instance, assume that C-level user wants to




This query would suit a regular relational data-
base. However, in our MLS database this
opeartion calls for the following procedure:
EXECUTE PROCEDURE sinsert Enterprise
Roumulus Trading
The procedure calculates value for security la-
bels  for C-level user it would be: 0  2*3 
0*9  6 and executes the following query:
INSERT INTO starship
VALUESEnterprise  Roumulus 
Trading   	
5. Implementation: Verify
Verification can be explicit  by using a com-
mand or implicit  consequence of some other
action such as delete procedure. For the pur-
pose of explicit verification, we implemented
BCMLS ’verify’ procedure shown below. L
represents the security label, while ’type’ rep-
resents the type of verify: true, false, unverify.
procedure verify L type 
get user security level



















Explicit verification is maintained throughout








tuple where key xkey AND lb	 xlb	

Implicit verification is maintained through
DELETEandUPDATEprocedures as delete con-
straint and update constraint.
6. Implementation: Delete
During the implementation of DELETE we use
the attribute ‘flag’ to indicate to higher level
users  who have belief about current tuple if
the tuple is changed or deleted by the primary
 lower level user.
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If the U-level user executes the following com-
mand on the table depicted by the views shown
in Tables 5, 6, and 7:
DELETE FROM starship
WHERE vessel   Hawk
the tuple must not be deleted because the C and
S-level users have set their belief onto that tu-
ple. Instead of deleting, the verify procedure
will be executed. The tuple will be unverified
on U-level. The flag will be set for C and S-
level users that indicate that the original tuple is
deleted and that they have to explicitly decide
what to do with that tuple. The S-level view of






Cruiser C Protecting C Venus C
Hawk CS Spying CS Mars CS CS
Micra U-C Observation U-C Moon U-C
Table 8.
The value CS in the flag attribute for the middle
tuple indicates, to both C and S level users  the
flag would be seen as C only on C-level that
they can either delete this tuple  in effect accept
the delete from the U-level or re-verify this tu-
ple as true. The U-level view of the database




The logic behind the flag value  which is also
an integer is similar to the logic developed for
the tuple classification. If lbflag , then the
flag is set. That means that a user on that level
must explicitly decide what to do with the belief
on that tuple, because the tuple has changed or
has been deleted.
The user can delete tuple only if pl tcc where
c is user level that executed the delete proce-
dure. Otherwise, the delete will be rejected.
The delete procedure has some additional after-
delete effects. After the delete is done, the un-
verify procedure is executed for all tuples with
the sameEID  KKC as the deleted tuple, hav-
ing lb tc1  belief: false. Since these were
cover stories, they must be unverified after the









unverify tuple for current
user
set












The UPDATE procedure consists of four rules.
If a user on the security level c issues a com-
mand to update an MLS relation R:
t  R, if t satisfies P :
1. if pl tTC  c, t will be updated.
2. if pl tTC  c and lb c, tTC  c, a
new tuple tn based on t will be inserted on c
level, while the attribute values of tuple t will
not change.
3. if pl tTC  c and lb c, tTC  
and ti  R such that ti K   t K  and
pl  ti K   pl  t K  and pl  ti TC  c, a
new tuple tn based on t will be inserted on the
c level, while the attribute values of t itself will
not change.
4. if pl  t TC  c and lb  c t TC   and
ti  R such that: tiK   tK , pl tiK  
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pl tK  and pl tiTC  c, the user will choose
a tuple tu from among all ti’s  including t, and
a new tuple tn based on tu will be inserted on
the c level, while the attribute values of tu itself
will not change.
Our version of the described UPDATE proce-
dure is developed using stored procedures and
triggers in combination with a PHP code. This
code, in essence, represents a middleware. Its
purpose is to provide convenience for further
programming. It enables the call of functions
for update with right arguments; and then it
checks the conditions, prepares the query and
executes it.
All sensitive codes are kept in one library  DLL
in windows world. The programmers of client
applications can use these functions without
knowing their structure. This has two major
advantages. First, programming for the appli-
cation code programmers is easier. The second
one is related to a security issue. These func-
tions can reveal sensitive information about in-
ner structure of MLS database and because of
that, it is a good idea to cloak them.
This is convenient for the development of client-
server applications, where sensitive code can be
put into the a middleware layer, along with ac-
cess lists which control the possibility of delet-
ing and verifying tuples for a specific user.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
Semantic completeness of BCMLS makes it
powerful enough to withstand any demand that
can be put on MLS database system today. Its
implementation is relatively complicated but ac-
complishable, as we illustrated with our proto-
type. Significant amount of work has to be
done on server side and client side in order for
this model to work in real life. Aside from the
loss of performance due to additional control
operations and verifications, the major issue is
additional changing the database structure.
More work has to be done in order to make
this model attractive for commercial purposes.
There is some amount of automatic verification
processing in the background and  as our future
projectwe will perform an analysis on the pos-
sible loss of performance caused by these and
other operations  such as converting integer la-
bels into character strings. We will simulate
MLS databases with hundreds of tables. In such
environment it will be interesting to estimate the
price of join, update and delete and to see how
much of CPU time is required for maintenance
of the consistency of the entire visible world.
The other issue that will have to be considered
is the possibility of changing the structure of
such MLS databases after they have been put
into production state. The implementation has
to support the changes to the database structure
in production state, so the whole model does not
have to be table-structure dependant. There are
two ways of accomplishing that:
1. To construct the tool that will allow modifi-
cations to the MLS database as if it is the regular
relational database. Such tool would translate
the user’s modifications into the MLS world.
The user is involved in specific MLS issues as
little as possible.
2. To make all database design on regular rela-
tional database. After the construction or mod-
ifications are complete, the tool translates the
model into the MLS world.
The first method is conceptually better because
it is easier to make changes to the production-
state databases.
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